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Abstract 
 
 
 
The 2009 Iranian uprising and the 2011 Egyptian uprising were widely publicized 
and closely followed by the global community. Social media became central to the way 
each uprising was experienced, and social media made a major contribution to the way 
the revolutions were explained to the outside world. Scholars and journalists have praised 
the role of social media in these two situations; Evgeny Morozov referred to it as a 
“liberator of authoritarian regimes,” and arguing that “democracy is just a tweet away.”1  
The uprisings were the result of a decade of social and political unrest and 
discontent among populations that were dissatisfied with their current regimes. In both 
cases, the effects of social media were undeniable catalyzing anger into protest over an 
authoritarian regime. Although it cannot be said that social media were the sole cause of 
these uprisings, social media did play a major role in bringing to the forefront a 
revolution that had been festering in the background for some time.  
This thesis examines the extent to which social media played a role in the political 
uprisings in Iran and Egypt. It considers the various types of social media, the effects of 
each one in the efforts to mobilize protesters, and the very different responses of the 
respective government regimes in Iran and Egypt.   
 
                                                
 1 Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion (London, Penguin Books, 2011): 37. 
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Chapter I 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 The Internet, mobile phones, and social networking applications have transformed 
politics across North Africa and the Middle East.1 This thesis will examine the uprisings 
that took place in Iran in 2009 and in Egypt in 2011 by comparing the degree to which 
social media was integral to political mobilization in Egypt as compared to Iran, and 
under what conditions social media played a role in each instance. In both cases, what 
began as a tool to help develop the economic and social sectors soon became a tool for a 
political change as well.  
 The 2009 Iranian uprising, which occurred after a disputed presidential election, 
caused the government to wage a vigorous campaign against Internet freedoms.2 In 
Egypt, “the Egyptian government, aggressively and successfully pursued expanding 
access to the Internet as an engine of economic growth.”3 Ironically, that expansion 
ultimately became an important element that encouraged political change in the 2011 
uprising. In both countries, social media tools were effectively used to coordinate and 
mobilize collective actions for political change.  
                                                            
1 Philip Howard, The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and 
Political Islam (London: Oxford University Press, 2011), 1. 
2 Freedom House website, 3. See:  <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/ 
Scorechangeexplanations.pdf.>  
3 Freedom House, 2.  
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 The thesis aims to explain variations in the extent of social media as a driver and 
method of coordination, and why it was more extensive in the 2011 Egyptian uprising 
than in the 2009 Iran uprising. The nature and the degree of authoritarianism in each 
country was a pivotal factor. For example, in Iran, the government response was 
immediate, and there were few possibilities for free expression. In Egypt, the government 
tolerated more freedom of expression, and government responsiveness was slower, which 
enabled the uprising to build momentum.  
 The effect of social media and the Internet in both uprisings is undeniable. 
However, social media did not cause the uprisings, nor can social media explain the 
underlying reasons for the uprisings. Social media did affect how and when protests took 
place. Also, while socioeconomic issues played a role in fueling these uprisings, social 
media was crucial for bringing international attention to both movements by quickly 
spreading information about the protests. Social media facilitated both uprisings by 
sharing information and encouraging mobilization. 
 In Egypt, social media was used to organize citizens prior to the protests. Access 
to social media was relatively open, with no government oversight and the strong 
presence of international media sources. That uprising benefited from social media by 
using it as a tool for sharing and gaining international attention. The Egyptian 
government did not quickly block Internet communication, which enabled the momentum 
of the uprising to grow. Egyptians also relied on traditional media such as television, 
which has always been extremely popular in Egypt, and even today remains the most 
powerful medium in terms of outreach to the population. 
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 In contrast, Iranian citizens perceived social media tools as useful and safe means 
for communicating without incurring government censorship and suppression. Citizens 
used every possible tool (Facebook, Twitter, text messaging) to coordinate and protest 
but they were eventually “brought to their knees by violent crackdowns.”4 Following the 
election, the Iranian government blocked all social media sites except Twitter, and in fact 
used social media to propel its own counter-strategies. The government intensely filtered 
social networking sites and mobile phones, and many cyber activists and journalists were 
arrested.5  
 The outcome of each uprising was influenced by a complex mix of variables. The 
extent and availability of social media had a part in shaping the distinctive nature of 
authoritarian rule in each country, which helps to explain each government’s initial 
response to its respective uprising.  
I hypothesize that the nature and level of the authoritarian regime is a critical 
factor in the effective use of social media for political mobilization. For example, Egypt 
under Mubarak had an authoritarian regime, but one that permitted more freedom of 
expression than was allowed in Iran. Egypt’s tolerance for dissent was higher, and its 
citizens had greater access to external media sources. In Iran, Internet censorship is one 
of the most comprehensive and sophisticated systems in the world.  
 The socioeconomic differences between the two countries is important for 
understanding the nature of the uprisings and the power structure of each authoritarian 
                                                            
4 Shirky, Clay. “The political power of social media.” Council of Foreign Affairs. January/February 
2011. Available from: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2010-12-20/political-power-social-media. 
Accessed Feb. 21, 2017  
5 Freedom House, 2-3.  
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regime. In Egypt, the government provided limited subsidies to keep the population 
content and to maintain the government’s quasi-authoritarian rule. Previous fuel subsidies 
proved to be too costly to maintain, amounting to 8% of Egypt’s GDP. Because Egypt is 
not a rentier state,6 its subsidy system became increasingly unsustainable. The 
government was unable to expand employment to pacify protestors. In Iran, however, the 
economy was heavily dependent on income from fuel, and as a rentier state it had a long 
history of subsidizing welfare and state security organizations to serve the regime’s 
interests and to pacify the population. The financial resources of the Iranian government 
enabled it to more easily create employment during periods of discontent.  
 To assess the hypothesis, I will rely on scholarly works published in academic 
journals, books written by experts, and data derived from social media tools, specifically 
data concerning the number of people joining Facebook and Twitter during the Iranian 
and Egyptian uprisings. This data will show the Internet penetration of social media tools. 
I will also examine how quickly a message is disseminated to a wide audience based on 
how often a tweet is re-tweeted; which will reveal the effect that social media had on 
mobilization. In addition, I will analyze the government’s initial response to its respective 
uprising and the counterstrategies utilized.  
 This study discusses the extent to which social media played a role in the 
dynamics of political mobilization compared to other causal variables. To analyze these 
two uprisings, I use the comparative method to clarify the diverse factors that contributed 
to the 2009 Iranian uprising and the 2011 Egyptian uprising. I use a method known as 
Most Similar System Design (MSSD), which analyzes similarities between the two 
                                                            
6 A rentier nation is one that derives all or a substantial portion of its national revenues from the rent of 
indigenous resources to external clients. Source: < https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rentier_state>. 
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countries, with the differences explaining the outcome of interest, which in this case is 
the extent to which social media facilitated mobilization. The main explanatory variable 
is the type of political regime, more specifically, the particular modes of social control 
that characterized the Egyptian and Iranian styles of authoritarianism. This in turn shaped 
the degree to which citizens were able to use social media to facilitate social 
mobilization. Table 1 illustrates the MSSD system to identify dependent variables that 
contributed to two very different outcomes.  
Table 1: The Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD)  
Source: thesis author 
ATTRIBUTE EGYPT IRAN 
Population size 88 million 81 million 
Youth unemployment 24%  26% 
Literacy rate 75% 83 % 
Inflation rate/ income gaps 10% 13% 
Internet penetration 31/100 people 39/100 people 
Mobile subscriptions 114/ 100 people 88/100 people 
Regime Type Authoritarian (republic) Authoritarian  (Islamic Republic) 
Regime mode of social 
control 
Egypt score: -3—moderate 
authoritarianism, more 
freedom & liberty regarding 
political participation 
Iran score: -7—autocratic 
regime with limited political 
participation in the country 
Outcome: use of social media 
n social mobilization High Low 
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 As Table 1 shows, the use of social media in the Egyptian uprising is high 
because Egyptian protesters successfully utilized it to organize and inform the world of 
their current situation and thus gain international support. In Iran, heavy government 
censorship was detrimental to the uprising. Citizens were unable to use social media to 
organize, and the desired outcome was low to unrealized. 
 The regime in Egypt is characterized as a republic, while the Iranian regime is 
identified as an Islamic republic. However, the nature of the authoritarianism in each 
country had different impacts on the extent and use of social media. The authoritarian 
regime in Egypt was dynamic in nature, and lauded as being open to change. However, 
Steven Cook  said: “[T]he incremental nature of the numerous reforms portrays a static 
nature,. . . there is almost constant political activity on various fronts, but no movement 
of the central interests of the state away from the core of the authoritarian leader.”7  
 In order to maintain a strong hand in the regime, President Mubarak needed the 
support of the military, and his dominance was ensured because the military remained 
loyal to him for 30 years. However, that changed during the Egyptian uprising, and the 
loss of military support played a decisive role in the strength of the political mobilization 
and the use of social media to support and keep mobilization strong.  
 In contrast, the authoritarian regime in Iran was stricter and tolerated little 
freedom of expression. As an Islamic Republic, the religious authorities governed, and 
religious law was part of the country’s legal code.8 The Iranian government had some 
difficulty dealing with the popular culture and social media, viewing the new 
                                                            
7 Steven Cook, Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development In Egypt, Algeria, 
And Turkey (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), ix. 
 
 8 Sergey Votyagov, “Islamic Republic of Iran; Comparative National Systems.” 2009. Available from:  
http://www.mitchellorenstein.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Iran.pdf. Accessed Feb. 21, 2017. 
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technologies as a major threat to the regime. During the 2009 uprising, the Iranian 
government forbade coverage of demonstrations, and arrested a large number of 
journalists and protestors. It severely filtered, then blocked all social networks and 
websites. Eventually the Iranian government hacked into social media accounts and used 
it found there as a tool to “extract information to identify key leaders, and disrupting 
attempts to organize protests.”9 This helped the regime to maintain its power by 
monitoring and intimidating its citizens.  
 The Iranian government eventually suppressed the uprising because it had the full 
support of the military. The Iranian military is very much tied to the Supreme Leader, and 
it is the military’s best interests to protect the current regime and its own survival. With 
the support of the government, the Iranian military was brutal and ruthless when the 
uprising began, it did everything to contain the situation.  
 
 
 
                                                            
9 Kathleen German, “Social Media and Citizen Journalism in the 2009 Iranian Protests: The Case of 
Neda Agha-Soltan,” Journal of Mass Communication Journalism 4, no. 5 (2014): 4.  
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Chapter II 
 
Background 
 
 
 
 Social media is a driving force that has a significant global impact on social and 
political change. It is also a critical tool available virtually worldwide to activists, 
citizens, telecommunication firms, nongovernmental organizations, governments, 
software providers, and civil society actors in general. Recently it has become an 
important resource for mobilizing, forming collective action, and stirring social 
movements around the world. The phenomenon of social media was made possible by 
innovative developments in communications, which in recent decades have become ever 
more complex. Technological advances have facilitated greater access to information, 
given most citizen more opportunities to engage in public speech and to undertake and 
join collective action.  
 Political mobilization via social media was evident from the Arab Spring 
movement, but it was also present in the revolutions in Moldova, Iran, and Tunis.10 The 
use of social media by opposition activists does not automatically guarantee successful 
results. What is clear is that social media is changing the game of politics and the nature 
of social movements by creating challenges for countries that are unprepared and ill-
equipped.11  
                                                            
10 Nahed Eltantawy, and Julie B. Wiest, “The Arab spring—social media in the Egyptian revolution: 
Reconsidering resource mobilization theory,” International Journal of Communication 5 (2011): 18. 
11 Magdalena Wojcieszak, and Brian Smith, “Will politics be tweeted? New media use by Iranian 
youth in 2011,” New Media & Society 16, no. 1 (2014): 100. 
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 The arrival of social media has stirred debates among scholars regarding its 
importance and effectiveness for social mobilization. On one side are scholars that 
celebrate the Internet and argue that social media plays a major role in forming collective 
actions, but they also believe it is not an effective tool for political mobilization. The 
other side recognizes the role of social media in political mobilization, but argues that its 
role should not be overstated. This thesis examines both sides of debate as it relates to the 
2009 Iranian uprising and the 2011 Egyptian uprising. I will show that the Iranian 
revolution demonstrated that social media alone was not enough to successfully mobilize 
the populace. By comparison, the Egyptian uprising illustrates the extent to which the use 
of social media contributed to successful political mobilization. I also found that certain 
aspects of a social-media-based revolution are necessary for a revolution to be successful 
—or at least greatly facilitate its success.  
 There is broad agreement among scholars such as Miriyam Aouragh and Anne 
Alexander that social media was not the only contributor to these uprisings. Several other 
factors and activities contributed to the development of events that triggered the 
uprisings. In both instances, the uprising emerged out of an environment of sustained 
oppression and discontent.12 According to Nahed Eltantawy and Julie Wiest, factors such 
as social and economic uncertainty, high youth unemployment, and corruption fed local 
tensions until the angry mood of the country erupted. The overall despair of everyday life 
coupled with a political climate, seemed to be the tipping point that caused citizens  
                                                            
12 Miriyam Aouragh, and Anne Alexander, “The Egyptian experience: Sense and nonsense of the 
Internet revolution,” International Journal of Communication, 5 (2011): 1344-1358. 
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to revolt and to form a strong basis for mass mobilization.13 As Samuel Huntington 
argues, instability surfaces when institutions cannot keep up with societal and economic 
change. This shows that social, institutional, and economic contexts provide the 
underlying motives and conditions for social movements.14  
 
Research Variables 
 The variables to be examined are the outcome variable and the explanatory 
variable. The explanatory variable is comprised of the socioeconomic and institutional 
attributes that these two countries share similarities. I will elaborate on each of these 
variables and their measures to demonstrate their full effect in each uprising.  
 The institutional variable is the political regime in each country. Both countries 
are ruled by authoritarian regimes that lack democracy, where levels of corruption are 
embedded and are directly linked with the socioeconomic factors that cause unbearable 
deprivation and economic inequality.  
 To measure the level of each authoritarian regime, I used the Polity Project report, 
which captures and then measures the authority of each regime based on a three-part 
categorization: autocracies (-10 to -6), anocracies ( -5 to +5), and democracies (+6 to 
+10). In addition to the Polity Project report I also describe each regime structure in order 
to portray different levels of authoritarianism.15 
  
                                                            
13 Eltantawy and Wiest, “The Arab Spring,” 5. 
14 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1968), 412. 
15 Polity Project report. Available from: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html.>  
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Variables in the Egyptian Regime 
 The Egyptian regime is secular and not ideological it is based on republicanism 
and in theory is a semi-presidential system of government.16 The country has been under 
emergency law for almost half a century in order to maintain national security. As Katie 
Wright notes, laws in effect at the time allowed the Egyptian government to revoke 
countless basic constitutional rights. The Egyptian people suffered severe police brutality, 
mass censorship, detention without charge and torture at the hands of State Security 
Officers and police.17 Citizens had greater access to social media and international 
sources of information, and satellite television was allowed. 
 In the Polity Project report, Egypt scored -3, which is on the moderate spectrum 
of authoritarianism, with more freedom and liberty when it comes to political 
participation. While there were some 13 recognized political parties in Egypt, they were 
subject to systematic and widespread restrictions. In sum, political participation was 
restricted. 
  
Variables in the Iranian Regime 
 In 2011, the Iranian regime was based on a unique fusion of religious and political 
authority. Iran was (and is today) a theocratic Islamic Republic led by a Supreme Leader 
who exerts ideological and political power over a system dominated by clerics. The 
regime uses religion and Islamic philosophies to justify criminal behavior and oppression. 
According to Green, et al., the Iranian regime is closed, secretive, and clannish making 
                                                            
16 See: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Egypt.> 
 17 Katie B. Wright, “Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice: Understanding the Egyptian Revolution,”  
(Lake Forest, IL: Lake Forest College Publications, 2013): 5.  Available from:  
<http://publications.lakeforest.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=firstyear_writing_contest.>   
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the system intensely fractured and multipolar.18 To understand this complex system, the 
role of major players and formal institutions is crucial. In Iran, the most powerful 
political figure is the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, who has kept his vision of 
the Islamic Republic remarkably resolute and consistent over the past 18 years. Much of 
his strength rests on his presumed moral authority and his skillful orchestration of 
informal networks by blocking any alternative approaches to the Iranian system. Most 
important, much of the Supreme Leader’s influence rests on his ability to mediate, and 
placate constituencies within Iran’s defense and security establishment.19 Beneath the 
office of the Supreme Leader there is a highly pluralistic political system comprising 
more than 200 parties and countless informal networks. In addition, there is a 
complicated structure of the defense establishment and its representative institutions.20 As 
a rentier state, Iran derives a large portion of its revenues from external rents, namely, the 
sale of oil, which remains the most important driver of economic growth and the source 
of political and financial power in Iran.  
 The Polity Progress report measures authoritarianism in Iran at -7, which is 
defined as an autocratic regime with very limited political participation in the country. 
This is because the regime structure is which the ruling Islamic clergy controls political 
competition, and all the candidates for the elected offices need to be approved by the 
                                                            
18 Jerrold D. Green, Frederic Wehrey, Charles Wolf, Jr., “Understanding Iran” (Santa Monica, CA: 
Rand National Security Research Division, 2009): 30. Available from: <http://www.rand.org/content/ 
dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG771.pdf.>  
19 Green, Wehrey, and Wolf, “Understanding Iran,” 30.  
20 Green, Wehrey, and Wolf, “Understanding Iran,” 25.  
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Council of Guardians on the basis of an ill-defined set of requirements.21 That level of 
authoritarians also limits freedom of speech and the involvement of social media in the 
country. Only the state-run media were allowed, and they were restricted and censored. 
The government also used social media and the Internet as tools for counter strategy and 
intimidation.  
 
Socioeconomic Variables 
 Socioeconomic variables also effected the uprisings in both countries. These 
variables include: a high number of young people as a percentage of the population, and a 
high level of unemployment among those young people.  
 Egypt and Iran are comparable in population size and with the similar population 
profile: 60% of the population are young people under the age of 30. In both countries, 
young people are facile with social media and well educated. Both countries struggle to 
generate sufficient jobs annually to employ new graduates. In 2010, unemployment 
among young people in Iran was 23%, and in Egypt it was 25%.22 High unemployment 
often has a direct correlation with uprisings, and contributes strongly to overall 
discontent.23 In addition to the unemployment, there was a high income-inequality gap 
and poverty rates that contributed to an already tense political climate. 
  
 
                                                            
21 Polity Project report. 
22 World Bank, “MENA Quarterly Economic Brief,” Issue 2 (January 2014): 9. Available from: 
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/MNA/QEBissue2January2014FINAL.pdf. 
23 World Bank, “MENA Quarterly Economic Brief,” 9.  
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Technology Variable 
 The technology variable examines the extent to which social media played an 
important role in contributing to mobilization in Egypt and Iran. In Egypt, almost 
everyone has access to a mobile phone. The country has the largest Internet user 
population in the region, second only to Iran. In Egypt in 2011 there were approximately 
20 million Internet users. The number of mobile phone users has grown to 55 million, or 
a 67% penetration rate.24 Egypt leads Arab countries in terms of Facebook use; at the end 
of 2010, there were more than 4.5 million users.25  
 In 2009, Iran had 30.2 million mobile phone users, or put another way, 88 cellular 
subscriptions for every 100 people.26 Internet users in Iran account for approximately 
48.5% of the population.27 Today Iran has the nineteenth-largest population in the world, 
and its blogosphere ranks number three in terms of users—behind only the United States 
and China.28 In summary, both countries had access to social media tools, but in Iran 
Internet access was obstructed by the regime at the time of the 2009 uprising.  
 
                                                            
24 Freedom House, 124. 
25 Freedom House, 125.  
26 Sanja Kelly, and Sarah Cook, eds., “Freedom on the Net 2011: A Global Assessment of Internet and 
Digital Media,” Freedom House, 2011. Available from: <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/ 
FOTN2011.pdf.>  
27 “Usage and Population Statistics.” Available from: <http://www.Internetworldstats.com/me/ir.htm>. 
28 Sara Beth Elson, Douglas Yeung, Parisa Roshan, S. R. Bohandy, and Alireza Nader, Using Social 
Media to Gauge Iranian Public Opinion and Mood After the 2009 Election (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2012).  Available from: <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2012/ 
RAND_TR1161.pdf.> 
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Social Media Tools 
 Social media tools are part of the broader sphere of information communication 
technology, and can be defined as “tools and utilities that allow online communication 
and individual participation.29 The term social media refers to networks and information 
technology that use the interactive form and user-produced content. Websites and 
applications enable users to create and share content and to network with others. In this 
section, I will examine Internet penetration and tools that were available and used in Iran 
and Egypt during the period 2009 to 2011. My aim is to determine the extent to which 
various tools were integral to political mobilization during the uprisings in those 
countries.  
 There is no doubt that social media provided protesters in both countries with new 
resources. Those media facilitated the spread of messages through a dense network that 
connected people with similar interests and goals in every country in the world. 
According to Nadia Idle and Alex Nunns, social media was one of the key causes of the 
protests. While some think the role of social media was limited to organizing protests and 
mobilizing protesters, others point to its role in publicizing forthcoming events.30 In this 
thesis, I will focus on four social media tools that played a crucial role in the uprisings in 
Iran and Egypt: Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and blog sites.  
 
                                                            
29 Alex Newson, and Justin Patten, “Blogging and Other Social Media: Exploiting the Technology and 
Protecting the Enterprise,” Journal Library Collections, Acquisitions, & Technical Services, .35, no. 4 
(2009): 3. 
  30 Nadia Idle, and Alex Nunns, Tweets from Tahrir: Egypt’s Revolution as it Unfolded, in the Words of 
the People Who Made It. (E-book, 2011). Available from: <http://www.orbooks.com/catalog/ tweets-from-
tahrir/>. 
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Facebook 
 Facebook is a social networking website launched in 2004. As of 2016, it had 
over 1.59 billion active users worldwide.31 Facebook allows registered users to create 
profiles, send messages, upload photos and videos, and keep in touch with friends, family 
and colleagues.  
 During the uprisings, Facebook was used to create interest groups or “like” pages 
where people could share opinions regarding specific topics. This feature became the 
main platform from which Egyptians shared collective dissent and organized the uprising.  
 It is important to note that 51.7% of Facebook users access their accounts via their 
mobile phone. This was a crucial role of social media during the “Arab Spring” 
uprisings.32 Statistics shows that 41% Egyptian Facebook users are between the ages of 
18 and 24 years old.33 With some 4.7 million Facebook users, Egypt constitutes about 
22% of total users in the Arab region.34 
 
Twitter 
 Twitter is a real-time information network that connects user with the latest 
information. It can be used to organize and disseminate news by bypassing the 
                                                            
31 Statista: The Statistics Portal, “Global social networks ranked by number of users.” 2014. Available 
from: <http://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of-users/.>  
Accessed Feb. 12, 2017.  
32 Statista: Statistics Portal.   
33 Statista: Statistics Portal. 
34 Arab Social Media Report , “Facebook Usage: Factors and Analysis,” Dubai School of Government,  
2011. Available from:  <http://www.arabsocialmediareport.com/UserManagement/PDF/ 
ASMR%20Report%201.pdf>.  Accessed Feb. 12, 2017.  
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cumbersome operations of mainstream media.35 Users communicate via “tweets,” which 
are short messages (limited to 140 characters) that also allow embedded media links. 
Tweets can be read remotely from different websites, or they can be received as a text 
message. There is no need to visit a website to read a tweet. Like to Facebook interest 
pages, Twitter users can subscribe to follow or receive updates on topics of interest or 
any conventional media new sources and posts.  
 During the 2009 Iranian so-called “Twitter Revolution,” the most popular hashtag 
was #iranelection, which reached 220,000 tweet per hour.36 In March 2011, during the 
Egyptian uprising, the numbers were even higher. The most popular hashtags were 
#egypt (1.4 million mentions) and #jan25 (1.2 million).37  
 
YouTube 
 YouTube is a website primarily used to upload and share videos. It has over a 
billion users, with more than half of its views and uploads coming from mobile devices.38 
YouTube provides a platform for individuals to interacts, inform, and inspire others 
nationally and internationally. During the Egyptian uprising, a number of uploaded 
videos documented episodes of police brutality, which were subsequently shared on 
                                                            
35 Petros Iosofidis, and Mark Wheeler, “The public sphere and network democracy: Social movements 
and political change,” Global Media Journal. Available from: <https://www.globalmediajournal.com/open-
access/the-public-sphere-and-network-democracy-social-movements-and-political-
change.php?aid=64445>.  Accessed Feb. 16, 2017. 
36 Payvand blog site. “Iran’s elections topped Twitter’s list of most popular topics of 2009.” See: 
<http://payvand.com/blog/blog/2009/12/17/irans-elections-topped-twitters-list-of-most-popular-topics-of-
2009/.> Accessed Feb. 12, 2017.  
37 Mourtada Racha, and Salem Fadi. “Civil movements: The impact of Facebook NS Twitter,” Arab 
Social Media Report (2011): 28.  
38 YouTube statistics. Available from: <https://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html.> 
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YouTube for the rest of the world to view. The Iranian government foresaw the impact 
that YouTube could have globally and, as a consequence, during the post-election period 
YouTube was blocked for use within Iran.  
 
Weblogs 
 Also, referred as “blogs,” are regularly updated websites similar to an online 
personal journal. A blog is usually run by an individual or a group sharing the 
information in informal and conversational style. Blogs were helpful for providing 
consistent updates during both uprisings. In the case of the Iranian revolution, Andrew 
Sullivan provided minute-by-minute updates on the situation in Tehran. At the time of the 
uprising, he was based in London but blogged continually with updates that the Iranian 
people had tried to share with the rest of the world. Sullivan shared their tweets and 
videos on his blog to raise international awareness about the situation in Tehran. Sullivan 
called Twitter “a critical tool in organizing the resistance in Iran.”  
 Over the last ten years, the Arab region has experienced the highest rates of 
technology adoption amongst all developing nations.39 Among the transformations in the 
information environment in the Arab world was the introduction of satellite TV in the late 
1990s. Al-Jazeera, a major news outlet in the Middle East, opened new space for political 
communication, thereby breaking the ability of states to control the flow of information, 
while also producing a new kind of Arab public sphere. Al Jazeera’s audience grew 
rapidly, and today it is perhaps the most widely read and viewed online news source in 
                                                            
39 Howard, “The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy,” 19-20.  
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the Arab world.40 It has played an indispensable role in amplifying social media 
narratives internationally. During the protest in Tahrir Square, activists pleaded with Al 
Jazeera not to stop filming, saying, “If you switch off your cameras tonight, there will be 
genocide . . . You are protecting us by showing what is happening in Tahrir Square”41  
 
                                                            
40 Marc Lynch, “After Egypt: The limits and promise of online challenges to the authoritarian Arab 
state,” Perspectives on Politics 9, no. 2 (2011): 304. 
41 Philip N. Howard, and Muzammil M. Hussain, Democracy’s Fourth Wave? Digital Media and the 
Arab Spring (London: Oxford University Press, 2013), 90. Also available from: 
<https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/117564/Democracy's+Fourth+Wave.pdf?sequen
ce=1>. 
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Chapter III 
 
Literature Review 
 
 
 
 Social media tools made headlines in the Arab uprisings because of their 
contributions and effectiveness. However, Bruce Bimber stated that the social media 
debate is controversial. On one side there are scholars who believe that social media 
played a crucial role in the political mobilization in Iran and Egypt.42 The other side 
believes that social media is not the only factor responsible for the uprisings, suggesting 
that deep-rooted discontent with political and social conditions played a major part in the 
uprisings. Authors Aouragh and Alexander,43 and Eltantawy and Wiest,44 believe that 
other factors contributed to the development of events that triggered the protests. 
Analysis of both sides of the social media debate illustrates the nature of these 
discussions and the different views pertaining to the role of social media in the uprisings. 
It compares the different points of view and sheds light on how social media has been 
viewed both in a comparative and a theoretical perspective.  
 There are several possible explanations regarding the outcome and why the use of 
social media had a different impact in these two countries. One explanation focuses on 
                                                            
42 Bruce Bimber, “The Internet and political transformation: Populism, community and accelerated 
pluralism,” Polity 31 (1998): 133-160. 
43 Aouragh and Alexander, “The Egyptian Experience,” 1344-1358. 
44 Eltantawy and Wiest, “The Arab spring,” 5. 
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the regime structure and the government’s response to the uprising.45 Both countries have 
authoritarian regimes, but on authoritarianism scale, Egypt was ranked lower, with a freer 
political climate and freer political expression. This is confirmed by the regime’s 
responsiveness: during the uprising, the Egyptian government did not oppose the 
protestors nor did it shut down all social media.46 In contrast, the Iranian regime’s swift 
response was brutal and inflexible. The intensity of aggression by the government had the 
psychological impact of striking fear into the protestors.47 Also, the government used the 
same social media to track down and intimidate protestors.  
 Evgeny Morzov48 argues that social media was not a crucial player in the 
uprisings in these two countries; indeed, he is skeptical of the political capabilities of 
social media. He believes that Twitter or any social media can only be successful in 
“regimes where the state apparatus is completely ignorant of the Internet and has no 
presence of its own.”49 The Iranian uprising proved Morzov was right: the use of social 
media by protesters left them vulnerable to government surveillance. While the protesters 
used social media to advance their cause, the Iranian authorities used the same social 
media against the protesters. The Iranian government involvement in technology and 
social media played a decisive role in the outcome of the uprising.  
                                                            
  45 Ali Ahmadi Motlagh, “Egypt and Iran: A comparison of two mass movements,” Muftah, 2011. 
Available from:  <http://muftah.org/egypt-iran-a-comparison-of-two-mass-movements-by-ali-ahmadi-
motlagh/#.WJfDlNIzXoo>.  Accessed February 16, 2017. 
46 Motlagh, “Egypt and Iran.”  
47 Motlagh, “Egypt and Iran.”   
48 Morozov is a writer and researcher who studies the political and social implications of technology.  
49 Evgeny Morozov, “Iran: Downside to the ‘Twitter Revolution,’” Dissent (2009): 12. 
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 Another possible explanation for the successful outcome in Egypt was the 
resources that were available during the protest. The Egyptian government did not seek to 
control the use of social media or traditional media, such as satellite television, mainly Al 
Jazeera, which was present at the time in Cairo. 50 
 Scholars such as Marc Lynch51 believe that traditional media, with the help of 
social media, played a vital role in the 2011 uprising. He argues that satellite television, 
local radio, semi-independent press outlets, and the Internet propelled the 2011 
revolution, acting as an accelerant and intensifier of many forms of political mobilization 
and facilitating sudden outbursts of intense contention.52 Social media had the resources 
to organize movements, spread information, and evade governmental control of the flow 
of news and ideas.  
 Lynch’s views on social media are relatively modest compared to Philip 
Howard,53 who argues that social media was the catalyst that enabled the protests to 
begin and then to spread the uprising. He argues:  
The importance of the Internet for contemporary Arab civil society actors 
can be attributed two factors: first, groups were pushed online because 
many other political communications were inaccessible. Second, the 
Internet enabled content to be hosted on servers beyond state censorship 
and afforded anonymity to those who advanced political criticism. . . . 
                                                            
50 Habibul Haque Khondker, “Role of the new media in the Arab Spring,” Globalization (2011): 675-
679. 
51 Lynch is a Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University 
and the author of many books on the Middle East.  
52 Lynch, “After Egypt,” 304.  
53 Philip Howard is a Professor at the University of Washington and the author of numerous empirical 
research articles on the use of digital media for social control in both democracies and authoritarian 
regimes.  
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During the uprising the Internet provided virtual space for political 
communication. 54  
 
 Clay Shirky55 sees social media tools as a natural evolution whereby social media 
has replaced old mobilization structures and become the new tool for coordinating current 
popular movements throughout the world, mainly because of the capabilities that “social 
media has introduced: the speed and interactivity that were lacking in the traditional 
mobilization techniques, which generally included the use of leaflets, posters, and 
faxes.”56 During the Arab uprising, Facebook and Twitter reached millions of people 
around the world as events were happening, facilitating a mass mobilization and 
reinforcing collective actions of protestors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
54 Howard and Hussain, “Democracy’s Fourth Wave,” 5. 
55 Clay Shirky is a professor, writer, and consultant on the social and economic effects of Internet 
technologies.  
56 Eltantawy and Wiest, "The Arab spring,” 7. 
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Chapter IV 
 
The Political Situation in Egypt 
 
 
 
 The authoritarianism that characterized Hosni Mubarak’s time in office could be 
called a “triple-hybrid regime, meaning the governing structure has characteristics of all 
three types of an authoritarian system: personalist, militarist, and single-party.”57 
Mubarak’s authoritarian style was distinct, and through a system of patronage he ensured 
his continued strong position in the country.  
 Jason Brownlee is a theorist on authoritarian regimes who posits a compelling 
perspective on institutional factors as the main guarantor of regime perseverance. He 
cites the significance of “two conditions necessary for the maintenance of the system.”58 
as an indicator of how well a regime will survive: “First, the new administration must 
exploit its underlying influence over the state to shape establishments that channel its 
own energy into the basic hubs of society that must be controlled to deter challenge to its 
rule. . . . Second, the administration ought to organization some type of restricted races,  
. . . which will redirect some resistance activities into seeking a stake in the 
administration.59 Brownlee cites a third truth about authoritarian regimes as the effective 
                                                            
57 Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 28. 
58 Quoted in: Andrea M. Perkins, “Mubarak’s machine: The durability of the authoritarian regime in 
Egypt,” Graduate thesis, University of South Florida, 2010: 7. Available from: 
<http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2736&context=etd>. Accessed Feb. 20, 2017. 
 59 Perkins, “Mubarak’s machine,” 7. 
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management of elite conflict [that] facilitates the protection of the regime through 
patronage relationships.60 Mubarak did just this, which eliminated any friction from the 
elites. 
 For some time, Mubarak maintained a solid political assembly that allowed the 
authoritarian regime to sanction structures and procedures that supported a strong and 
abusive apparatus ranging from security powers to media oversight. One example was the 
Emergency Law, implemented in 1981, which reduced citizens' rights and criminalized 
any activity regarded as destructive to the state. This permitted the administration to use 
expansive interpretations of "destructive to the state" to legitimize crackdowns on any 
political difference.61  
 To some, the 2011 Egyptian uprising might have come as a surprise, but for the 
Egyptian people it was a natural evolution of long-simmering resentment, social 
injustices, and discontent. The revolt was characterized by three decades of pervasive 
restlessness due to unemployment, corruption, inequality and lack of democracy. The 
Egyptian people advocated for a democratic government, while President Mubarak 
utilized a dictatorial form of governance that he believed was impervious to change.  
 While it is hard to argue that social media was crucial to the Egyptian uprising, it 
certainly had a significant impact. The 2011 uprising did not come out of nowhere. 
Rather, it was the product of years of repression, fueled by anger at the authoritarian 
structure of governance, the lack of democracy, and rampant socioeconomic problems 
                                                            
60 Perkins, “Mubarak’s machine,” 7. 
61 Brownlee, “Authoritarianism,” 203. 
  
 
26 
coupled with high unemployment among educated youth, social inequality, and 
deteriorating economic conditions, which fomented political mobilization. 
 Ann Lesch found that prior to the 2011 uprising, corruption was prevalent, 
reaching its highest point in the mid-2000s.62 Newly appointed ministers used their 
influence to acquire and sell large portions of the public sector for their personal gain, 
enabling them to advance their personal interests to the detriment of the Egyptian 
people.63  
The lack of democracy also played a part. President Mubarak ruled for three 
decades by establishing a bureaucratic government in which all powers were centralized 
in the executive branch,64 and there was no transparency in parliamentary elections. 
Human rights abuse were apparent in the myriad demonstrations that were quashed by 
the heavy hand of the Emergency Law. The country had been in a constant state of 
emergency since 1967, which gave security forces the power to detain protesters for long 
periods of time without formal charges, and censoring the media.65 All of this led to a 
situation ripe for revolution.  
 Socioeconomic factors contributed significantly to the deteriorating conditions. 
The overall economy of Egypt showed signs of improvement, with positive GDP growth: 
                                                            
62 Ann M. Lesch, “Egypt’s Spring: Causes of the Revolution,” Middle East Policy Council XVIII, no. 3 
(2011): 1‒8.  
63 Gokhan Akcesme, “Poverty and economic inequality as the leading causes of the 2011 Egyptian 
revolution,” International Journal of Political Science and Development, 3, no. 9 (Sept. 2015): 353-375. 
Available from: <http://www.academicresearchjournals.org/IJPSD/PDF/2015/September/AKCESME.pdf>.  
Accessed Feb. 20, 2017. 
64 Lesch, “Egypt’s Spring, 1‒8. 
65 Eltantawy and Wiest, “Arab Spring,” 5.   
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from 5% in the mid-1990s to 7% from 2006 to 2008.66 However, the gap between rich 
and poor was enormous. While the Egyptian economy grew, this growth did not trickle 
down due to corruption that benefited only the regime’s narrow political base. A 2008 
United Nations report showed that 20% of the Egyptian population lived below the 
poverty line.67 Even at the peak of the global economic boom, when the Egypt nation 
itself recorded annual economic growth of 7.2 %, the number of Egyptians living below 
poverty line (defined as $2/day) rose from 17.8% to 23% (see Figure 1).68  
 
 
Fig. 1. Proportion of population living below $2 a day income poverty line. 
Source:  Abdou and Zaasou, 2013. 
 
                                                            
66 Noha Bakr, “The Egyptian Revolution,” Chapter 4. In: Change and Opportunities in the Emerging 
Mediterranean, by Stephen Calleya and Monika Wohlfeld, eds. (Malta: Gutenberg Press, 2012): 57-81. 
Available from: <https://www.um.edu.mt/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/150394/Chapter_4_-
_Noha_Bakr.pdf>. Accessed Feb. 20, 2017. 
 67 “Human Development Report 2007-2008,” UNDP report, 2008. Available from: 
<http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/268/hdr_20072008_en_complete.pdf.> Accessed Feb. 20, 
2017. 
68 World Bank Development Research Group, “Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (% of 
population), 2011. Available from: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY>. Accessed Feb. 
20, 2017. 
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Agricultural inflation also put extraordinary pressure on Egypt’s working class 
because their wages were overwhelmingly spent on food to sustain themselves.69 Another 
impact that contributed to an already exhausted economy was oil prices. Egypt was a 
vulnerable to fluctuations in oil prices, and its consequences were most deeply felt on the 
middle class. As harvests declined, the cost of production and transport began to 
increasing especially as oil prices increased, and the price of imported food, particularly 
wheat, began to escalate. Rising costs of bread, low supplies of water, and sharp rises in 
the cost of other crucial items were fundamental elements of discontent among the 
Egyptian populace.  
While Egyptians from many walks of life took place in the 2011 uprising, what 
formed the basis of the revolt was the extraordinary number of young people who 
participated in the demonstrations. For years a corrupt government overlooked putting 
resources into and investing in the younger generation, creating widespread 
dissatisfaction that provided grounds for revolt. Youth unemployment at the time of the 
uprising was 26.3%70 (see Figure 2). Technology became an important tool in the 
uprising because the youth population was extremely tech-savvy. With technology 
proliferation and improved information literacy, digital media became a proximate cause 
of the Egyptian uprising. Social media offered speed and interactivity that were absent in 
traditional mobilization techniques.  
                                                            
69 Akcesme, “Poverty and economic inequality.”  
70 World Bank Data, “Unemployment Youth Total, 1991-2014.” Available from: 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=EG>.  Accessed Feb. 20, 2017. 
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Fig. 2. Unemployment rate and employment to population ratio, 1999-2010.  
Source: Abdou & Zeinab, 2013: 102. 
 
 
 
Egypt is known for its vibrant blogosphere and relatively liberal policies on online 
content, unlike Iran and other Arab countries. Prior to the uprising, Egyptians used social 
media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter to post mobilization strategies. Facebook 
became one of the most popular tools during that time with almost 5 million registered 
users in Egypt. It was best suited for organizing protests, starting with a group of friends 
that would snowball to their friends and so on. In a short period, more and more people 
joined the initiative.  
Twitter was ideal for coordinating people who had already joined the protest. 
Because of the nature of Twitter which enables everyone to follow others, it soon became 
a tool for reporting about events in Egypt to the outside world, while YouTube supported 
those messages with videos. By combining the different types of social media tools and 
their multiple functions, Egyptians were able to mobilize quickly and attracted many 
followers.  
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One of the most influential was the Facebook page, “We are all Khaled Said,” 
referring to a young blogger who was beaten and killed after allegedly posting an 
incriminating video of two police officers splitting the drugs they seized. Media reports 
and bloggers claimed that Said was approached by two police officers who demanded 
money. When he told them he didn’t have any, they began beating him until he died on 
June 6, 2010. In reaction to his murder, Wael Ghonim, Middle Eastern marketing director 
for Google, created a Facebook page “We Are All Khaled Said” and publicized the 
photos of Said’s corpse. The page quickly became a platform for discussions and shared 
grievances regarding President Mubarak’s regime and its routine police brutality against 
civilians. The event became a key politically motivated event that contributed to the 
January 25 uprising. It was effectively used to frame an issue around which protesters 
could unite. His death framed the cause and addressed the politics of a process that can 
turn a group or an idea into a movement.71  
In the week prior to January 25, 2011, notice of a protest was posted on the “We 
are Khaled Said” Facebook page, and Egyptian citizens were asked to join. Some 80,000 
people pledged that they would attend.72 Prior to January 25, a number of people 
contemplated going, although one “prominent blogger conceded that even he wasn’t 
taking the mobilization seriously.”73 That day, some 20,000 people went out on the 
streets—a record-breaking turnout. This cannot be attributed solely to social media. 
                                                            
71 Felix Tusa, “ How social media can shape a protest movement: The cases of Egypt in 2011 and Iran 
in 2009,” Arab Media and Society, 17 (2013): 5. 
72 Wendy Pearlman, “Emotions and the microfoundations of the Arab uprising,” Perspectives on 
Politics 11, no. 2 (2013): 397. 
73 Kahalil Ashraf. “Liberation Square: Inside the Egyptian Revolution and the Rebirth of a Nation” 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2012), 130. 
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Rather, the collective action was the result of despair, oppression, and hope; people 
showed up because they had had enough. Social media simply gave them the tool to 
communicate their message and to organize. Perhaps the high turnout could be attributed 
to the large number of people who pledged on Facebook “I am attending,” which in some 
way gave them a sense that they were not alone because thousands of other people had 
also pledged. During that time, social media provided the protesters a new tool to 
influence the dynamics of mobilization, which led to its success. 
While one cannot argue that this was an Internet revolution, one can emphasize 
the resources that Egyptian people used to implement the revolution. The availability of 
resources made mobilization possible, and in the case of Egypt, access to resources 
became easier because of social media. This connectedness can actually be attributed to 
the Egyptian government, which started a government initiative in 1999 to expand 
Egypt’s information technology capabilities as one way to promote socioeconomic 
development by providing free Internet access, low-cost computers and the expansion of 
Internet access centers.74 In the Arab world Egypt was viewed as technologically 
developed. The Ministry of Communications and Information Technology counted 23 
million broadband Internet users in a population of 83 million, with 9 million cell phone 
Internet users.75 During the one month period between January 10 and February 10, 93 
million tweets were exchanged within Egypt, and between Egypt and the outside world.76 
Egyptian protestors used social media for a minute by minute updates and to draw 
                                                            
74 Eltantawy and Wiest, 5. 
75 Aouragh, and Alexander, “The Egyptian Experience,” 1347. 
76 Bakr, “The Egyptian Revolution.”  
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attention when in danger. The Guardian cited tweets by Egyptian video journalist 
Mouhamed Abdelfatthan:  
@mfatta7 Tear gas 
@mfatta7 I’m suffocating 
@mfatta7 We r trapped inside a building 
@mfatta7 Armored vehicles outside 
@mfatta7 Help we r suffocating 
@mfatta7 I will be arrested 
@mfatta7 Help !!! 
@mfatta7 Arrested 
@mfatta7 Ikve [I’ve] been beaten a lot 77 
In addition, he posted pictures of the protest and police brutality, all of which generated 
international attention that later led to Mubarak’s resignation.78 
Successful mobilization would not have been possible without satellite television, 
which has always been popular in Egypt. It was another powerful medium in terms of 
outreach. With almost all household owning a television in 2010, “72 percent of 
Egyptians depended on television as a primary source of political news; television 
channels have the best shot at influencing the opinions of nearly 75 percent of 
                                                            
77 The Guardian Newsblog. “Protests in Egypt and Unrest in the Middle East—as it happened,” 
January 25, 2011. Available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/global/blog/2011/jan/25/middleeast-
tunisia>. Accessed Feb. 20, 2017. 
78 Guardian Newsblog.  
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Egyptians.”79 During the uprising, Al-Jazeera became the primary source of real-time 
news for Egyptians. Al-Jazeera had seven teams in Cairo and multiple reporters 
throughout Egypt, all of whom were covering the uprisings from different cities. Al-
Jazeera was the only news outlet that streamed live reports out of Egypt and updated the 
global audience on the evolving situation. It also made its content available to other news 
sources with charge and without permission.80 The ensuing cross-references between 
social media tools and Al-Jazeera by re-tweets from Egyptian protesters on the streets, 
was important for ensuring the credibility, authenticity, and validity of the social media 
content. It also played a role in ensuring that people’s voices were heard and unified.  
 The use of social media also proved to be invaluable when the government 
banned reporters from Tahrir Square to prevent news from spreading to the world; during 
that time, social media tools enabled protesters to become citizen journalists. When 
President Mubarak’s regime realized that social media were being used for organizing, he 
ordered the shutdown of the Internet and cellular communications, and suspended Al-
Jazeera, canceling its licenses and withdrawing the accreditation of its entire staff as of 
January 30, 2011.81 Aware of the monetary effect such a shutdown would bring, 
President Mubarak had no other choice if he wanted to keep the revolution under control. 
The economic impact of the Internet shutdown was enormous: an estimated $90 million 
                                                            
79 Guardian newsblog, 24.  
80 Sam Gustin, “As Egypt erupts, Al Jazeera offers its news for free to other networks,” Wired, Jan. 28, 
2011. Available from: <http://www.wired.com/2011/01/al-jazeera-egypt/>. Accessed Feb. 20, 2017. 
81 Rasha Abdulla, “Egypt’s media in the midst of revolution,” Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace (2014): 58. Available from: <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/mapping-
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in losses.82 However, Egyptian activists and citizens figured how to bypass government 
censorship by using intermediary servers, landlines, and traditional mobilization 
techniques. This flow of information kept the social mobilization going and reinforced 
collective actions. Howard argues that government efforts to crack down on social media 
actually may have encouraged more public activists. People who were isolated because of 
the Internet shutdown (mostly middle-class Egyptians) went out on the streets when they 
could no longer follow events through social media and television.83  
Even after Egyptian government shut down the Internet, Egyptians were already 
mobilized, out on the streets, and conversations moved from online to offline and face to 
face. The government’s action angered many people but also forced them to use offline 
forms of communication and mobilization to keep the momentum going and to mobilize 
those who did not have Internet access. This was achieved with the use of taxi drivers to 
spread the information.84 
Another important factor that contributed to Egyptian success if the response level 
of the government, at the beginning of the uprising President Mubarak was unwilling to 
employ decisive force to steam the uprising. The inability to deal with the crisis from the 
get goes was in small part caused by the Egyptian military’s refusal to crack down on 
protesters. This emboldened protestor and allowed the rebellion to gain the momentum.  
                                                            
82 Sahar Khamis, and Katherine Vaughn, “Cyberactivism in the Egyptian Revolution: How civic 
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In Egypt, the military is the most powerful institution, and it supported President 
Mubarak throughout his entire tenure. Yet, during the uprising, the military chose not to 
act, sending a clear signal that the military favored the demonstrators and that its 
expected support of the union and President Mubarak’s administration had ended, thus 
clearing the way for Mubarak’s exit. The military showed its independence from the 
civilian and political apparatus, and demonstrated its influential status in the country.  
 
Summary 
Calling the Egyptian and Iranian uprisings a “Twitter revolution” or a “Facebook 
revolution” does not capture the deep-seated factors behind those revolutions. It was 
primarily socioeconomic and political discontent, facilitated by social media. It must be 
said, however, for most Egyptians living on two dollars a week, political activity was the 
last thing on their mind. But the Egyptian uprising could not have happened as it did 
without the existence of social media. That said, there is no doubt that social media 
played a contributing role in the Egyptian revolution, and helped bring to the forefront a 
revolution that had been developing in the background, fueled by socio-political 
conditions.  
Some scholars assert that Egypt was ripe for revolution,85 and dramatic change 
would have come at some point in the next few years, even without spark of Tunisia or 
the existence of social media. It is important to acknowledge that in the context of the 
Egyptian uprising, social media played a part in arranging protests and bringing the 
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attention of the international community. Facebook, Twitter, blogs, and YouTube were 
all used to achieve different purposes and share the message. A combination of these 
social media tools favored mobilization, making it much faster and cheaper to mobilize 
many people in a short period of time. It was easier for activists to disseminate messages 
and videos to an international audience, thus strengthening the collective identity and 
mobilizing the citizens.  
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Chapter V 
 
The Political Situation in Iran 
 
 
 
The 2009 Iranian Revolution (also known as the “Green Revolution,” or the 
“Twitter Revolution”) did not appear suddenly out of nowhere. It was the culmination of 
events that began with Iran’s tenth presidential election held on June 12, 2009. At the 
time, many young Iranians were dissatisfied with the administration’s seeming inability 
to address their needs. People felt disregarded, especially when the government refused to 
spend resources and establish programs to address the huge problem of youth 
unemployment. Like Egypt, the roots of the Iranian uprising were based on socio-
political issues in the country. The complex and corrupt political structure angered 
people, as well double-digit inflation. Combined with other economic problems, rising 
unemployment problem added further fuel to the fires of discontent. In this chapter, I 
focus on background information and the combination of factors that contributed to the 
Iranian Revolution. The primary focus is on the extent to which social media was integral 
to the mobilization in Iran.  
The political structure of Iran is very complex. The government is a fusion of an 
authoritarian state with a theocratic regime, where the religious authority and religious 
law is part of the country’s legal code. In this system, a mullah (often referred to as 
“Supreme Guide”) has unlimited power without responsibility, while the elected 
President has more responsibility than power.  
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Iran is a clientelistic state, meaning it is a combination of both “traditional and 
religious relations between superior and subordinates.”86 A clientelistic government 
prevents class division, and demands are achieved through bribing government agencies 
rather than exerting pressure for legal and political reform. The lack of class divisions 
also creates obstacles to development. In modern types of clientelism, the source of 
income is the nation’s rentier status, and in Iran that is oil. Therefore, in modern political 
clientelism, patrons aim to hold government positions so they can have access to 
government payouts. 
The power structure is composed of many autonomous, parallel groups formed 
through patron-client bonds.87 Iran’s political landscape is not a canopy-like structure, in 
which a central pole holds the structure together; instead, it is built on many rival, 
parallel, and independent pillars of power that hold the system together.88 The power 
structures are based on rival but autonomous groups, and traditional Shi’a institutions 
sometimes conflict with the elected government.89 This structure of parallel, unelected 
institutions is designed to keep both the executive and legislative apparatus in check. The 
dual power structure is headed by a supreme leader and a president, respectively.  
                                                            
86 Lowell Barrington, Comparative Politics: Structures and Choices (Covington, KY: Wadsworth 
Publishing, 2012): 339. 
87 Kazem Alamdari, “The power structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Transition from populism to 
clientelism, and militarization of the government,” Third World Quarterly, 26, no. 8, (2005): 13. Available 
from: <http://www-tandfonline-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/ 
01436590500336690?needAccess=true>.  
88 Alamdari, “Power Structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” 14.  
89 Alamdari, “Power Structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” 2.  
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The highest religious office is held by the Ayatollah, at present Ayatollah Ali 
Khamenei, also called the Supreme Leader. He appoints the head of the judiciary, six 
members of the powerful Guardian Council, the commanders of all the armed forces, 
Friday prayer leaders, and the heads of radio and television. He also makes decisions on 
security, defense, and major foreign policy issues. Furthermore, he also confirms the 
president’s election. The Leader is chosen by clerics who make up the Assembly of 
Experts.90  
Based on the Iranian constitution, the role of president ranks him as “the second 
highest official in the country.”91 The president’s job is to ensure that the constitution is 
implemented. However, the “clerics and conservatives in Iran’s power structure 
circumscribe presidential powers.”92 
Fig. 3: Political structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
Source: BBC, 2009. 
                                                            
90 BBC. “How Iran is Ruled,” July 9, 2009. Available from: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
middle_east/8051750.stm#cabinet>. Accessed Feb. 20, 2017. 
91 BBC, “How Iran is Ruled.” 
92 BBC, “How Iran is Ruled.” 
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Due to this complex structure, reforms in Iran are difficult to achieve. Scholars 
argue that while changes are needed, it is not religious reform but rather political and 
economic reforms. The post-election protest was not about religious reform or regime 
change but a cry for socioeconomic improvements. 
As 2009 progressed toward election day, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s political and 
popular standing appeared to be declining due to the weakening economic environment in 
Iran. At the beginning of his first presidential term in 2005, oil prices were rising steadily, 
peaking at $150 per barrel by July 2008, of which the Iranian government received 80%. 
Investors injected billions of dollars into the economy through handouts and cheap loans. 
However, high oil prices and easy access to money also led to extensive inflation. 
In the first half of 2009, oil prices began to decline precipitously, eventually 
reaching $50 per barrel. At that point, Ahmadinejad’s generosity at government expense 
began to turn against him. Inflation was running high; the cost of housing and food were 
at all-time highs, and economic activity was slowing down because of rapid declines in 
foreign reserves. Since Iran’s economy was heavily dependent on the price of crude oil, 
and the country was also under international economic sanctions due to its ongoing 
nuclear program, the overall economic outlook began to have a negative effect on the 
public’s perception of Ahmadinejad as president, and many people mobilized against his 
policies that weakened the performance of the Iranian economy. Even scholars predicted 
that “if change is to come to Iran, social and economic discontent would be a major 
reason.” 93 
                                                            
93 Nikki R. Keddie, “Women and 30 years of the Islamic Republic,” Middle East Institute Viewpoints, 
January 2009:48. Available from: <http://www.mei.edu/content/women-and-30-years-islamic-republic>. 
Accessed Feb. 21, 2017. 
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 What is also important is that more than 30 years of changes in the demographics 
of Iran have led to political and social shifts. The main protagonists of this change are 
known as “the children of the revolution”94—young people who were born at the 
beginning of the revolution, and have grown up in a nation that went from being one of 
the most liberal societies in the Middle East to a nation ruled by conservatives and 
religious institutions. The nation also went through a devastating eight-year war with 
Iraq, extreme swings in standards of living caused by oil booms and busts and crippling 
sanctions. Consequently, the “children of the revolution” could often be found at the front 
lines leading Iran’s uprising. They were highly educated, highly politicized, took their 
voting rights seriously (voting age is 16), and many willingly expressed their discontent 
with the social and political systems in place in 2009.  
Approximately 70% of Iranian youth live in urban centers, which increases the 
pressure on social institutions to provide services and employment.95 The unemployment 
rate among young people was 26% in Iran (see Figure 4), and “The average young 
Iranian graduate waits nearly three years for his first job and then his earning power is, 
and will almost always be, less than his parents.”96 Young people felt they had no future, 
especially given the absence of employment opportunities available to them upon  
 
                                                            
94 Annabelle Sreberny and Massoumeh Torfeh, Cultural Revolution in Iran: Contemporary Popular 
Culture in the Islamic Republic (I. B. Touris, 2013), 16.   
95 Seregey Votyagov, “Islamic Republic of Iran; Comparative National Systems,” 2009. Available 
from: < http://www.mitchellorenstein.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Iran.pdf>. Accessed Feb. 21, 2017. 
96 Navtej Dhillon, and Daniel Egel, “The many crises of Iranian youth,” HuffPost, n.d.  Available 
from: <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/navtej-dhillon/the-many-crises-of-irania_b_220897.html>.  
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Fig. 4. Youth unemployment rate in Iran, 1991-2014. 
Source: World Bank, “Youth unemployment rate for Iran.”  
  
graduation.97 Furthermore, women did not have the same rights as men, and many 
believed it was time for a change. Most people were convinced that reforms would come 
with the new government following the elections. Given the level of discontentment, 
when the election results were disclosed, the public was shocked and outraged. Iranians 
expected that Mousavi would win the election, so when the results showed that 
Ahmadinejad had won again, many of Mousavi’s supporters poured into the streets to 
protest the election outcome and question its validity. Frustration was already present 
                                                            
97 Charlotte Burchet, “The Iranian Green Movement: A promising uprising to a failed revolution,” 
Regional Insights website, February 2016. Available from: <http://www.regional-
insights.org/content/iranian-green-movement-promising-uprising-failed-revolution >. Accessed February 
21, 2017. 
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owing to the hardships of daily life, so the election became the tipping point, with people 
taking to social media to protest what they believed to be a rigged election.  
There is little doubt that social media played a role in Iranian politics, in this case 
focusing the world’s attention on the 2009 uprising. At the time, Iran led the region in 
Internet penetration rates, with approximately 49% of the population using some form of 
social media. The country also saw rapid growth in Internet use, from 250,000 users in 
December 2000 to approximately 36.5 million by mid-2011.98 Iranian mobile phone use 
far outpaced Internet use. In 2009, Iran had 30.2 million mobile phone users, with 88 
cellular subscriptions for every 100 people, and Internet access was widespread.99  
During the revolution, Iranians relied heavily on Twitter, Facebook, text 
messaging, and blogs created by local Iranians to quickly organize and coordinate 
opposition efforts and public demonstrations. At the time, many saw Twitter as providing 
a liberating outlet for dissenters, and the Western media heralded the Green Movement as 
a “Twitter revolution.” In truth, at the time of the revolution there were 19,235 Iranian 
twitter users in an estimated population of 70 million, obviously a small fraction. 
However, this number cannot be verified since some users registered themselves as being 
in Iran when in fact they were located elsewhere.100 The Web Ecology Project confirmed 
that most of the tweets about the election came from outside Iran.101 At the peak of the 
                                                            
98 Freedom House website, 2009. 
99 Freedom House website, 2009.  
100 Sysomos blogsite, “A Look at Twitter in Iran,” June 21, 2009. Available from: 
<http://blog.sysomos.com/2009/06/21/a-look-at-Twitter-in-iran/>.  Accessed Feb. 22, 2017.  
101 Web Ecology Project, June 26, 2009. Available from: <http://www.webecologyproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2009/08/WEP-twitterFINAL.pdf>. Accessed Feb. 22, 2017. 
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protest #IranElection topped 221,744 tweets in one hour.102 In fact, however, the word 
was spread at home rather than by people becoming mobilized and coming out to 
participate in the protests. Also, the hype of the tweets came mainly from outside Iran 
and from the Iranian diaspora that participated remotely. “Due to the small percentage of 
tweets that originated in Iran, it seems Twitter has been used as a system for publicizing 
events in Iran to the rest of the world instead of as an organizing tool for Iranians during 
protests”103 (see Figures 5 and 6).  
 
 
Fig. 5: Percentage of tweets about #IranElection 
Note: This figure shows the percentage of tweets that came from Iran before the government shut down the 
Internet and social media. 
Source:  Sysomos blogsite.
                                                            
102 Ben Parr, “Mindblowing #IranElection stats: 221,744 Tweets per hour at peak.” Mashable website, 
June 17, 2009. Available from: <http://mashable.com/2009/06/17/iranelection-crisis-
numbers/#gpJGzTtCJEqW>. Accessed Feb. 22, 2017. 
103 Jamileh Kadivar, “A Comparative Study of Government Surveillance of Social Media and Mobile 
Phone Communications during Iran’s Green Movement (2009) and the UK Riots (2011),” Journal for a 
Global Sustainable Information Society, vol. 15, no. 1 (2015): 175. Available from:  
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303111114_A_Comparative_Study_of_Government_Surveillan
ce_of_Social_Media_and_Mobile_Phone_Communications_during_Iran's_Green_Movement_2009_and_t
he_UK_Riots_2011>. Accessed Feb. 21, 2017. 
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Fig. 6: Number of tweets on #IranElection per hour 
Note: At the peak of Iranian revolution, the #Iranelection reached 221,774 tweets per hour, demonstrating 
that the uprising was being followed by a world-wide audience. 
Source: Parr, 2009 
 
 
Some believe the Western media may have misrepresented the role of Twitter and 
Facebook in the uprising, since the penetration of social media did not have as much 
impact on people at the time.104 Many were influenced by Iran’s state-owned television 
and radio. But Clay Shirky argues that the Internet and social media allowed Iranian 
reformists to “coordinate with one another better than previously, and to broadcast events 
like Basij violence to the rest of the world.”105  
                                                            
104 Peter Beaumont, “The truth about Twitter, Facebook, and the uprisings in the Arab world,”  
Guardian, Feb. 25, 2011.  Available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/25/twitter-
facebook-uprisings-arab-libya>. Accessed Feb. 21, 2017.  
105 Clay Shirky, “The net advantage,” Prospect, December 11, 2009. Available from> 
<http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2009/12/the-net-advantage/>.  
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 The government’s responsiveness also played a role in the outcome of the Iranian 
revolution. Unlike Egypt, the Iranian regime was brutal and uncompromising. Despite the 
peaceful nature of demonstrations, the police and a paramilitary group called Basij 
suppressed the protestors by attacking and arresting them. The government response 
struck “fear in the hearts of protesters decreases their numbers with each passing day.”106 
Contrary to the Egyptian military which held back on taking a stand, Iran’s military 
maintained close ties to the “government and over the years have become even more 
entwined within the political and economic activities of the regime.”107 The position of 
the Iranian military would be greatly compromised if the regime fell from power, so it 
was in their own interests to protect the regime from change.  
 It is interesting to note that while the protesters used social media during the 
movement, the Iranian authorities used it against the protesters as well. The government 
was known for its use of filtering technology and media censorship, and the approaching 
election led to an increase in online surveillance. By taking advantage of the increased 
use of social media, the Iranian government became even more powerful than before the 
election, allowing the government to introduce a more advanced system of surveillance 
and recognition that “strengthened the government’s position after the election.”108 
Thereafter, government surveillance intensified, and “the government started sending 
threatening and warning text messages to protesters about their presence in the 
                                                            
106 Motlagh, “Egypt and Iran.”  
107 Motlagh, “Egypt and Iran.”  
108 Kadivar, “A Comparative Study of Government Surveillance,” 176. 
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protests.”109 The Iranian authorities too measures to steps all the online correspondence 
and used them as reasons for judicial discipline. They even extended their reach and 
began to intimidate and undermine Iranians abroad.110 
 
Summary 
 
The Iranian Green Revolution in 2009 came to world attention through social 
media sharing. Protestors used social media to organize, but it was also about 
mobilization of certain groups. However, broad penetration to the general masses was 
difficult to achieve using only social media. Iranian scholar Kaveh Eshani noted that 
news of the protest moved more slowly because it did not reflect the structure of Iranian 
society; otherwise, it might have resulted in widespread mobilization. But dissemination 
of mobilization messages did not reach all classes of society owing to government 
censorship and shutdown of the Internet. Furthermore, Iran also did not make use of 
traditional mobilization techniques, such as television and print. 
In Egypt, in addition to social media, traditional mobilization techniques were 
also used, meaning that organizers went out into rural areas of Cairo to mobilize the 
lower class. Protesters knew that those people were not on social media so they used 
other techniques to achieve mass mobilization. The Egyptian case demonstrated that the 
use of traditional media in combination with social media resulted in broad exposure and 
greater mobilization. The traditional media forms also played a major role in shifting the 
                                                            
109 Kadivar, “A Comparative Study of Government Surveillance,” 176. 
110 Kadivar, “A Comparative Study of Government Surveillance,” 176. 
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American position toward the Mubarak regime, with powerful images broadcast on Al-
Jazeera and circulated via social media networks.111  
In Iran, in the post-election period, the government blocked Facebook and 
Google, shut down the cell phone network, and forcibly removed the foreign press. 
Moreover, the government expected the uprisings and it was prepared. It used Internet 
connectivity as a tool of counterinsurgency. Freed from international scrutiny, the 
government had the upper hand. It used the very same social media tools to quell dissent 
by launching a “global campaign of intimidation.”112  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
111 Lynch, “After Egypt,” 306. 
112 Peterson, Let the Swords Encircle Me, 620. 
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Chapter VI 
 
Analysis of the Role of Social Media in the Egyptian and Iranian Uprisings 
 
 
 
 In order to understand the impact of social media usage, I analyzed the Egypt 
2011 uprising and the 2009 Iran post- election protest. The effects of social media in both 
protests is undeniable, although it cannot be said that social media and the Internet were 
the sole cause of these uprisings. My analysis identifies how these protests took place 
with the help of social media, which facilitated and coordinated social mobilization in 
both instances.  
 
The Egyptian Uprising 
The more positive outcome in Egypt can be attributed to several factors. Most 
important was the lack of an immediate response by the government. President Mubarak 
seemed unwilling to employ decisive force to stem the uprising, and his failure to do so 
encouraged the protestors and enabled them to gain momentum. In addition, as 
mentioned earlier, the Egyptian military refused to crack down on the protestors. That 
absence of a forceful reaction on the part of the regime prompted scenes that had never 
been seen before amid the protests.  
Second, traditional media played a crucial role in broadcasting news of the unrest 
to the rest of the world, while also putting pressure on the Egyptian government. The 
addition of social media, which was everywhere among young Egyptians, played a major 
role in quickly spreading information, videos, and pictures, which hastened the 
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mobilization. The credibility of these tools was confirmed by already-respected mediums 
such as Al-Jazeera, BBC World, and so on. The fact that traditional media themselves 
used social media tools as sources of information, along with the interactions between 
social media and the satellite broadcasters, kept the momentum and mobilization strong 
and built increasing pressure from the international community to intervene in the matter.  
A third factor was the strategies used for effective mobilization. The Egyptian 
people did not rely solely on social media, even though Internet communication was 
faster. Protesters knew that to mobilize the wider population they had to use traditional 
methods of communication and face-to-face interaction. This strategy proved to be better 
for political planning and organizing, as it is built strong ties by building trust. My 
analysis found that the Internet and social media proved more useful for unifying people 
and creating a common political identity. This process was an important part of the 
Egyptian social movement, and a key learning about how populations can be mobilized 
through this process.  
 
The Iranian Uprising 
 The 2009 Green Movement began as a peaceful uprising, but the regime’s 
response was anything but. Several factors contributing to the eventual outcome. The first 
was the government structure itself. Iran’s government is very complex, and change is 
not easily achieved. It is a country of numerous paradoxes—a theocracy and a written 
constitution, with (at the same time) traditional and secular values. That fusion of religion 
and politics defined the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2009. 
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When the protest began, the regime stopped it before it transformed into a full 
revolution. Motlagh said, “The Iranian regime’s immediate response was brutal and 
uncompromising,”113 which played a major role in hindering mobilization. That iron-
hand style of control allowed the regime to suppress any opposition and most protestors. 
The government also applied military force to suppress the uprising. Furthermore, during 
the uprising the government cut communications inside and outside the county, jammed 
the Internet, and blocked all major social media sites. The organizers and protesters had 
no way to communicate. Eventually, the government regained control through fear, 
manipulation, and violence, but those actions had the psychological impact of striking 
fear into the hearts of protesters.   
The lack of any media presence was another important factor that played into the 
Iranian outcome. Foreign journalists and non-state media were banished immediately 
after the election. The only media available was the state-owned media that did not 
transmit any information about the uprising. During that time, the Iranian government 
blocked Facebook and all political blogs. Only Twitter was available, and it quickly 
became the main tool for organizing protests. Why did Twitter remain available? Because 
its server is based in the US.  
 Another factor was the organization strategies used by the protesters. There was 
no clearly framed and articulated desire for political change as there would be in Egypt 
when they desired an end to Mubarak’s regime. What specifically unified the Iranians 
was outrage over the results of a presidential election. Many were caught by surprise at 
the outcome. The pre-election period showed a relatively inactive society, with press 
                                                            
113 Motlagh, “Egypt and Iran.”  
  
 
52 
reports talking about a general disinterest among Iranians prior to the election. One 
editorial in an Iranian newspaper noted: “If a foreign expert visits our country in the 
current situation and watched TV, he [would] not believe that the presidential election 
will be held in Iran in less than two months.”114 
The number of social media users was estimated to be 19,235 — a small fraction 
of the Iranian population of some 70 million people. The low number showed that social 
media in Iran was not used at the time as a primary source of information. Also, the use 
of social media tools is very limited in Iran since the regime began using the same social 
media tools against the protesters by sending threatening messages to intimidate citizens. 
Overall, social media tools did not have an extensive impact in the Iranian upspring due 
to societal structure and social media penetration but also because of government 
structure and regime responsiveness.  
 
Relationship with the United States 
One other important factor was the relationship each country had with the United 
States. It is no secret that United States was a supporter and generous sponsor of 
President Mubarak’s regime. The US provided Egypt with annual military aid of 
approximately $1.3 billion, mainly to maintain an Arab-Israeli peace and to curb Iran’s 
growing influence in the region.115 Mubarak was concerned about how he would be 
perceived by the world if he used force in the uprising, especially since the regime lacked 
                                                            
114 Tusa, “How Social Media Can Shape a Protest Movement,” 9. 
115 Jeremy Sharp, “Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service, Feb. 25, 
2016. Available from:<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf>.  Accessed Feb. 22, 2017.  
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sufficient economic resources. As the world became aware of the uprising, that also 
contributed to Mubarak’s inability to act decisively.  
In contrast, the regime in Iran was not at all concerned about its use of force in 
response to the protest, because the regime did not feel obliged to answer to any foreign 
power. It could simply dismiss external objections because of its rentier state status.  
As Motlagh noted: “The antagonistic relationship between the United States and Iran 
continuously provided both sides with a bogeyman.”116 This hostile relationship enabled 
the Iranian regime to use to “great effect its efforts to neutralize the Green Movement.”117  
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Chapter VII 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
“Twitter doesn’t cause revolutions, but revolutions are tweeted”118 
 
 
 
The aim of this thesis was to explore the extent to which social media was utilized 
to facilitate the effective and widespread mobilization of protesters during the 2011 
Egyptian uprising and the 2009 Iran Green Movement uprising. I sought to determine 
what other factors might explain the overthrow of the earlier Iranian regime to the 2009 
uprising, which ultimately did not succeed, in part because of the lack of social media 
tools.  
While social media is important in both contexts, other media and other 
influential factors—the level of authoritarianism, access to traditional media, national 
resources—cannot be ignored. Some scholars believe social media caused these protests 
and argue that without social media, the protests would not have occurred. However, my 
research found that social media was not the root cause of the protests in either country. 
Rather, my analysis demonstrated that organizing social movements in Egypt and Iran 
was affected by the government regime, as well as political and social factors.  
An examination of these two case studies found that social media played a major 
role in building a collective identity within the population and among the protesters and 
                                                            
118 Lynch, “After Egypt,” 304. 
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greatly facilitated the cross-class social mobilization in Egypt. In that uprising, social 
media was used to frame a cause, and mobilize and organize the social movement that led 
to regime change. However, Egyptian protestors also used traditional mobilization 
techniques, which helped them achieve a cross-class mobilization. This occurred only 
with the help of traditional media that at the time was reporting live from Egypt and 
updating the world on the situation.  
Also, cross-coverage between social media and traditional media was important 
for building the credibility and authenticity of the media content. The traditional media 
played a major role in shifting the American position toward Mubarak, clearly influenced 
by powerful images broadcast on Al-Jazeera and circulated via social media. In contrast, 
during the post-election period in Iran, the government expelled all foreign press from the 
country, and the Internet was blocked, including Facebook and other blogs. The only 
means of communication left to Iranians was Twitter. But the effectiveness of Twitter for 
organization and mobilization was doubtful. Twitter gained public visibility in 2009 with 
“news breaks” that provided timely information that the traditional media could not 
produce. But in 2009, Twitter was a fairly novel technology to the rest of the world, 
which was apparent in its low user membership. There were only 8,654 Twitter users in 
Iran in mid-May 2009, although this number increased dramatically when the revolution 
started; still, it was only a tiny fraction of the overall Iranian population. It is obvious that 
the Iranian uprising was not a so-called “Twitter revolution” as proclaimed by the 
Western media; indeed, most of the tweets about the election and subsequent uprising 
came from outside Iran.  
  
 
56 
Each of the factors described here led to the level of discontent necessary to create 
the civil unrest that became transformed into a unified movement. There is no doubt that 
people used social media to build a political response. However, they were not inspired 
by social media but by real tragedies that were documented by social media.  
It is difficult to conclude whether the uprisings would have happened without 
social media. Both countries were ripe for revolution. My research showed that in the 
case of Egypt, social media facilitated social mobilization in an environment where it 
could be used to its full potential while reinforced by traditional media. The Egyptian 
outcome showed that a positive outcome is achievable with a less authoritarian political 
structure where social media tools can be used to their full potential for effective 
mobilization.  
The lack government responsiveness encouraged people to demonstrate and gain 
momentum, even as President Mubarak faced pressure from the United States. Mubarak 
also was unable to act decisively, in large part because he was had to consider how his 
efforts to maintain power would affect U.S. interests.  
The Iranian uprising demonstrated that change takes time, especially when it 
involves a complex government and regime structure. Such a structure enabled the 
Iranian government to suppress any form of mobilization. Moreover, an antagonistic 
relationship existed between the United States and Iran, and the regime used this 
relationship to great effect in its efforts to neutralize the uprising. Even today, Iran 
continues to portray the uprising as a clash of Iranian Islamic ideals and US imperialism.   
The Egyptian uprising had a positive outcome due to that country’s political structure and 
a mobilization strategy that utilized social media in combination with traditional media.  
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